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You Know More Than You Think: State v. Townsend,

Imputed Knowledge, and Implied Consent Under the
Washington Privacy Act
James A. Pautler*

I. INTRODUCTION

The Washington Privacy Act' ("WPA") was probably the last thing
on Donald Townsend's mind in May 1999 as he attempted to arrange a
sexual liaison with "Amber," whom he thought was a thirteen year-old
girl. 2 Using Internet-based e-mail and ICQ, 3 Townsend sent increasingly
graphic messages to Amber indicating his desire to have sex with her.4
Unbeknownst to Townsend, Amber was actually a Spokane County
police detective, Jerry Keller, who had been alerted to Townsend's
proclivities by an informant.5 During May and June 1999, Townsend and
Amber exchanged numerous e-mails and ICQ messages that Detective
Keller stored on his computer so he could "read the messages at his
leisure and print them for later use as evidence." 6 Ultimately, Townsend
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1.WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.73.010-9.73.140 (2004).
2. State v. Townsend, 147 Wash. 2d 666, 670, 57 P.3d 255, 257 (2002).
3. ICQ is an Internet
discussion software program that allows users to communicate as if they
are talking on the phone, but typing on the keyboard. Id.
4. Id. at 670-71, 57 P.3d at 257-258.
5. Id. at 670, 57 P.3d at 257.
6. Id.
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scheduled a rendezvous with Amber at a Spokane area hotel, where
Detective Keller arrested Townsend.7
Townsend was charged in state court with attempted second-degree
rape of a child.8 Other than his physical presence at the hotel, most of the
evidence against Townsend consisted of print-outs of the messages that
Detective Keller had downloaded and saved on his computer. 9
Under Washington law, the recording of a private conversation is
illegal unless all the participants consent.' ° Evidence obtained in
violation of the all-party consent rule is inadmissible in a civil or
criminal case." Because of the similarity between Keller's act of saving
the Internet communications to his computer, and of unlawfully
recording private conversations, Townsend moved to exclude the
evidence obtained from these recordings.' 2 The court denied Townsend's
motion in a memorandum decision that later was incorporated into
formal findings of fact and conclusions of law. 13 The court then found
Townsend guilty after a bench trial.' 4 Townsend timely appealed and the
court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. 5 The Washington
Supreme Court granted certiorari.16 In an en banc decision with three
opinions, the court held that Townsend's e-mail and ICQ messages were
admissible17 because Townsend had impliedly consented to their
recording.

The court decided Townsend wrongly. As Washington is one of
only twelve states that require the consent of all parties prior to the

7. Id. at 671, 57 P.3d at 258.
8. Brief for Appellant at 2, State v. Townsend, 105 Wash, App. 622, 20 P.3d 1027 (19304-7Ill). Townsend was charged under WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.076 (1999). Id.
9. State v. Townsend, 147 Wash. 2d 666, 671, 57 P.3d 255, 258 (2002).

10. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.030(l)(a) (2004) ("[l]t shall be unlawful for ...
Washington [or] its agencies ...

to intercept or record any ...

the state of

[plrivate communication transmitted

by telephone, telegraph, radio, or other device . . . without first obtaining the consent of all the
participants in the communication.").
I1. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.050 (2004) ("Any information obtained in violation of RCW

9.73.030 . . . shall be inadmissible in any civil or criminal case in all courts of general or limited
jurisdiction in this state, except with the permission of the person whose rights have been violated..
. ."1).

12. Townsend, 105 Wash. App. at 626, 20 P.3d at 1030.
13. Id. at 626-27, 20 P.3d at 1030.
14. Id.

15. Id. at 622, 20 P.3d at 1027. Townsend also appealed based on the fact that Amber was nonexistent and it was factually impossible to take a substantial step toward the rape of a non-existent
child. Id. at 630-31, 20 P.3d at 1032. The court rejected this argument also. Id. This ground for

appeal is beyond the scope of this Note.
16. State v. Townsend, 144 Wash. 2d 101, 632 P.3d 283 (2001).
17. See State v. Townsend, 147 Wash. 2d 666, 676, 57 P.3d 255, 260 (2002).
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recording of a private conversation,' 8 the Townsend decision was
inconsistent with the majority of Washington Supreme Court decisions
that have strongly supported the protections of the WPA. 19 Most striking,
however, was the court's faulty reasoning. By combining an incorrect
understanding of computer technology with a factually unsupported
inference, the court concluded that Donald Townsend impliedly
consented to the recording of his messages.
Townsend is worth examining for two additional reasons. First,
Townsend illustrates the palpable need for the legislature to update the
WPA. The underlying problem in Townsend was the application of a
statute that was written in the era of rotary telephones to the issues that
arise in modem electronic communications. Because of the inherent
differences between electronic and traditional media, novel questions
invariably arise that cannot be readily answered by resorting to existing
doctrines.20 Finally, the plain language of the current statute has absurd
results when applied to the modem infrastructure of the Internet.

18. Gary L. Bostwick & Jean-Paul Jassy, Flanagan's Wake: Newsgatherers Navigate
Uncertain Waters Following Flanagan v. Flanagan, 23 LoY. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 1, 10 n.50 (2002).
The other states are the following: California (CAL. CODE §§ 630-637.5), Connecticut (CONN. GEN.
STAT. §§ 52-184a, 52-570d, 53a-187 to 53a-189, 54-41a to 54-41t), Florida (FLA. STAT. ch. 934.01934.10), Illinois (720 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 5/14-1 to 5/14-9, 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 5/108A,
5/108B), Maryland (MD. CODE ANN., Cts. & Jud. Proc. §§ 10-401 to 10-414), Massachusetts
(MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99), Michigan (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 750.539), Montana (MONT.
CODE ANN. § 45-8-213), New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 570-A:1 to 570-A:1 I, 644:9),
Oregon (one-party consent for phone conversations, two-party consent for any other conversation),
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 133.721-133.739, 165.535-165.549), and Pennsylvania (PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 5701-50). See also Carol M. Bast, What's Bugging You? Inconsistenciesand Irrationalitiesof the
Law of Eavesdropping, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 837, Appendix B at 928 (1998); but see DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. II, § 1336 and tit. 11, § 2402(c)(4) (Delaware changed from two-party to one-party
consent in 1999).
19. For instance, in State v. Faford, 128 Wash. 2d 476, 488, 910 P.2d 447, 452 (1996), the
persistent eavesdropping of a nosy neighbor on wireless telephone conversations was held to be in
violation of the WPA. The court opined in the following way:
We recognize as technology races ahead with ever increasing speed, our subjective
expectations of privacy may be unconsciously altered. Our right to privacy may be
eroded without our awareness, much less our consent. We believe our legal right to
privacy should reflect thoughtful and purposeful choices rather than simply mirror the
current state of the commercial technology industry.
Id. at 485, 910 P.2d at 451 (quoting State v. Young, 123 Wash. 2d 173, 186, 867 P.2d 593, 598
(1994) (holding that police use of a thermal imaging device to perform warrantless search of a
defendant's residence violated Washington Constitution)).
Given the unambiguous language of the court in Faford, it seems incongruous that just six
years later, despite the WPA not being amended during that time, the court would make what
amounted to an about-face, holding against privacy rights in Townsend, which, like Faford,involved
a new technology.
20. William DeCoste, Sender Beware, the Discoverability and Admissibility of E-Mail. 2
VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 79, 82 (2000).
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Part 1I of this Note discusses the historical background of privacy
as it relates to communications technologies, how this historical
background has informed the evolution of the WPA, and how
Washington courts have interpreted the WPA..Part III presents the facts
of Townsend, a discussion of the court's analysis, and an examination of
the resulting fallout. Part IV concludes with several suggestions for
reform of the WPA.

1I.

THE BACKGROUND OF PRIVACY

Privacy is at the very soul of being human.2' Privacy, or the Right
to Be Let Alone, is perhaps the most personal of all legal principles.2 2
Although some argue that privacy is a product of modem culture,23 legal
rights to privacy appeared 2000 years ago in Jewish laws.24 The Talmud
explains that "a person's neighbor should not peer or look into his
house. 2 5 There are nearly as many definitions of privacy as there are
scholars who have written about the topic. 26 The elements of privacy
have been said to include seclusion, informational control, and autonomy
of personal life27 Privacy also comprises secrecy, anonymity, and
solitude. 28 "Most scholars view privacy as a concept pertaining to the
individual., 29 However, privacy also promotes culturally desirable
30
attributes such as a healthy, liberal, democratic, and pluralistic society.
The forces within society that lead to the invasion of privacy are just as
powerful. These include our innate curiosity about others, social control,
and the desire to gain an economic or social advantage. 3' Eavesdropping
statutes, such as the WPA, generally address an individual's desire to
control information about themselves, and to preserve whatever degree

21. WHITFIELD DIFFIA & SUSAN LANDAU, PRIVACY ON THE LINE, THE POLITICS OF
WIRETAPPING AND ENCRYPTION 126 (1998).
22. MORRIS L. ERNST & ALAN U. SCHWARTZ, THE RIGHT TO BE LET ALONE I (1977).

23. Id.
24. See DIFFIA & LANDAU, supra note 21, at 126 ("[If one man builds a wall opposite his
fellow's] windows, whether it is higher or lower than them .. .it may not be within four cubits [If
higher, it must be four cubits higher, for privacy's sake] (quoting HERBERT DANBY, THE MISHNAH

367 (Oxford University Press 1933)).
25. DIFFIA & LANDAU, supra note 21, at 126.

26. For a substantive discussion of several analytical views of privacy, see Bast, supra note 18,
at 881-85.
27. William C. Heffeman, Privacy Rights, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 737, 745-46 (1995).

28.
29.
30.
31.

Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 424 (1980).
Bast, supra note 18, at 885.
Id.
Id. at 890.
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32,

of seclusion they might desire.
Privacy statutes counterbalance
our
33
societal desire to hunt out and punish non-conforming behavior.
The balance of Part II will provide context for the court's analysis
in Townsend. Subpart A will discuss how privacy has been analyzed
under the United States Constitution in the face of evolving technology.
Subpart B will discuss the question of one-party versus all-party consent.
Subpart C will discuss privacy in Washington, including the evolution of
the WPA. Subpart D is a review of court holdings that have interpreted
the WPA.
A. The Evolution of Technology and Eavesdropping Under
the Federal Constitution
Prior to the American Revolution, British soldiers and customs
agents entered homes and offices at will and searched any person or
place they wished.34 This practice was so resented that Sam Adams said
that he regarded the unrest over general searches "as the Commencement
of the Controversy between Great Britain and America." 35 The value of
security in the sanctity of one's home is not only fundamental to our way
of thinking, but the Fourth Amendment 36 codification of this right
distinguishes America from the rest of the world. Our nation began not
only by inventing a new form of government but also by declaring that
one purpose of government was the protection of individual rights. 37 "To
secure these rights," wrote Thomas Jefferson, "governments are

instituted among men. 38
Although privacy is fundamental, our conception of whether we are
entitled to statutory protection has evolved over time. 39 The courts have
redefined our conception of privacy as technology has changed the way
we communicate. 40 In fact, technology is continually diminishing an
individual's actual privacy.
Prior to the invention of telephones,
32. Id. at 882.
33. Id. at 895.
34. Ira Glasser, The Struggle for a New Paradigm: Protecting Free Speech and Privacy in the
Virtual World of Cyberspace, 23 NOVA L. REV. 627, 638 (1999).
35. Id.
36. The Fourth Amendment reads as follows:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the

place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONstI. amend. IV.
37. Glasser, supra note 34, at 655.
38. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).

39. Bast, supra note 18, at 900.
40. Id.

41. Id. at 902.
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computers, bugs, wiretaps, laser interferometers, and thermal imaging,
one could simply stroll out of earshot of others to communicate
confidential information. 42 Eavesdropping 43 was a risky business,
punished by the colonists through the application of English common
law. 4 Other than clandestinely listening in on a conversation, the only
other way to obtain intelligence was through the use of a spy. Either way,
someone who wanted to keep a conversation private could exercise a
substantial degree of control over exposure of the conversation. Secret
conversations could be held where no one else could hear them.
Suspected spies could be dealt with harshly. However, as technology
changed the way we communicate, each new mode of communicating
private information has given rise to a new way of intercepting the
information.45 Unfortunately, statutory protection against unwanted
intrusion has lagged well behind adoption of invasive technologies.4 6
For example, today we take it for granted that the contents of a
first-class envelope are private. Although a postal delivery system has
existed since the beginning of our nation's history, it took a United States
Supreme Court decision in 1878, Ex parte Jackson,47 to hold that the
government could not open first-class mail without a search warrant.
More closely related to Internet communications, the courts were
just as sluggish in recognizing a privacy right in telephone conversations.
Fifty years after the introduction of the telephone, the Court declined to

42. DIFFIA & LANDAU, supra note 21, at 2.

43. Purportedly the practice of standing underneath the eaves of a building and listening to
conversations occurring within. See Bast, supranote 18, at 891.
44. DIFFIA & LANDAU, supra note 21, at 128.
45. Bast, supra note 18, at 891.
46. The following illustrates the point:

The lesson is that when new technologies develop the law must develop along with them
to maintain a proper balance between individual rights and government power. Just as the
invention of the printing press ushered in new laws that upset the balance and weakened
the right of free speech for centuries, so did the invention of the telephone when the law
failed to keep pace at the outset, permanently altering the balance of power between the
government and the individual, and ushering in an era of declining privacy rights that has
not yet ended.
See Glasser, supra note 34, at 644.
47. The Court held the following:

Letters and sealed packages of this kind in the mail are as fully guarded from
examination and inspection, except as to their outward form and weight, as if they were
retained by the parties forwarding them in their own domiciles. The constitutional
guaranty of the right of the people to be secure in their papers against unreasonable
searches and seizures extends to their papers, thus closed against inspection, wherever
they may be.
96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878) (Field, J.).

Interestingly, Justice Field's testament to the Fourth Amendment protection of the mail did not
benefit the petitioner, who argued unsuccessfully that the statute was unconstitutional. Id. at 738.
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extend Fourth Amendment protection to telephone conversations. 48 In
Olmstead v. United States, a Seattle-based bootlegger was convicted
using evidence derived from several telephone wiretaps placed by federal
prohibition agents. 49 The government tapped eight residential and
business telephones and compiled 775 pages of notes.5 ° The Court
reasoned that no constitutional violation had taken place since nothing
material was searched, such as "the house, his papers, or his effects.'
The Court justified this outcome by stating that the phone lines were not
part of a person's house, any more than "the highways along which they
are stretched. 52
Of the four dissents in Olmstead, the following passage from
Justice Brandeis's dissent is oft quoted:
When the Fourth and Fifth Amendments were adopted, [fjorce and
violence were then the only means known to man by which a
government could directly effect self-incrimination. Subtler and
more far-reaching means of invading privacy have become
available to the government. Discovery and invention have made it
possible for the government, by means far more effective than
stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is
whispered in the closet.53
Even the telephone companies, 54 who
issue much in concert with Brandeis. "[I]t
escape than that the privacies of life of all
agents of the government, who will act
unrestrained by the courts. 55

filed a brief as amici, saw the
is better that a few criminals
the people be exposed to the
at their own discretion . . .

48. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
49. Id. at 456.
50. Id. at 471.
51. Id. at 464
52. Id. at 465.
53. Id.
54. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., American Telephone & Telegraph Co., United States
Independent Telephone Ass'n, and Tri-State Telephone & Telegraph Co. Id. at 452.
55. Id. at 479 n.12 (quoting the amicus brief of the telephone companies). Olmstead also
protested the admissibility of the wiretap evidence on the basis that, in procuring the evidence, the
government violated a 1909 Washington statute that provided, "[elvery person . . . who shall
intercept, read, or in any manner interrupt or delay the sending of a message over any telegraph or
telephone line ... shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." Id. at 468 n.7, citing REM. COMP. STAT. §
2656(18) (1922) (current version at WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.010 (2004)). The majority found this
fact irrelevant, citing the common-law rule that the admissibility of evidence is not affected by the
illegality of the means by which it was obtained. Id. at 467. In response, Justice Brandeis wrote the
following:

To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means-to
declare that the government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a
private criminal would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this
court should resolutely set its face.
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It was not until 1967, nearly 100 years after the introduction of the
telephone, that the Court recognized the constitutional right of privacy in
telephone conversations. 56 In Katz v. United States, federal investigators
placed a listening device on the outside of a telephone booth such that
they could hear the defendant's side of the conversations.5 7 The Court
opined that "one who occupies [a telephone booth], shuts the door behind
him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to
assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be
rebroadcast to the world., 58 The two-fold test 59 for whether a person is
entitled to Fourth Amendment protection from electronic eavesdropping,
enunciated by Justice Harlan in his concurrence, has eclipsed the
majority opinion as precedent. 60 That is, (1) whether the person has
exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy, and 6 (2) whether the
expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize. '
B. One-Party Versus All-Party Consent
What Katz left unanswered was the question of whether a
participant in a conversation (such as a government informant) could
assent to a recording and thereby ameliorate what would otherwise be a
Fourth Amendment privacy violation. This is analogous to the situation
in Townsend, where Detective Keller recorded Townsend's e-mail and
ICQ messages without Townsend being aware of the recording.
United States v. White,62 a plurality opinion, established the
constitutionality of the one-party consent rule.63 The White Court held
Id. at 485.
56. Katz. v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
57. Id. at 348.

58. Id. at 351.
59. First, that a person must have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy;
second, that the expectation is that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Id. at 361.
60. See Bast, supra note 18, at 842.

61. The subjective intention of the parties is one of the factors used by Washington courts to
determine if a communication is private. The courts also consider other factors bearing on the
reasonableness of the participants' expectations, such as the duration and subject matter of the
communication, the location of the communication, the presence of potential third parties, and the
role of the nonconsenting party and his or her relationship to the consenting party. State v.
Townsend, 147 Wash. 2d 666, 673-74, 57 P.3d 255, 259 (2002).
62. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
63. Id. at 753-54. White established the constitutionality of the one-party consent rule on the

narrowest of grounds. Four justices (White, Stewart, Blackmun, and Berger) held that one-party
consent did not offend the Fourth Amendment. See id. Douglas, id. at 756, Harlan, id. at 768, and

Marshall, id. at 795, wrote separate dissenting opinions arguing that judicial authorization was
required even in the case where the government agent was a participant in the conversation.
Brennan, although concurring in the result, also adopted the dissent's position that the Fourth
Amendment required judicial authorization for electronic eavesdropping, even when the government
agent doing the recording was in a face-to-face conversation with the suspect. Id. at 755 (Brennan,
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that neither a recording device carried on the body of an agent, nor a
radio that transmits to recording equipment (or agents) located
elsewhere, constituted a Fourth Amendment violation.6 4 The plurality
drew an analogy with the situation of an undercover agent, or even a
traitor, who would be free to testify in court regarding what he saw, or
take notes regarding conversations.6 5 The plurality reasoned that if the
conduct of an agent does not violate a defendant's reasonable
expectations of privacy, then the fact that that same agent might be
equipped with electronic equipment is of no consequence.66 By placing
his trust in the confidant, the defendant assumed this risk.6 7
Douglas, in a voluminous dissent, began by stating that "what the
ancients knew as 'eavesdropping,' we now call 'electronic surveillance';
but to equate the two is to treat man's first gunpowder on the same level
as the nuclear bomb ....

Electronic surveillance is the greatest leveler of

human privacy ever known." 68 Quoting Justice Brennan's dissent in
Lopez v. United States: 69
[T]here is a qualitative difference between electronic surveillance,
whether the agents conceal the devices on their persons or in walls
or under beds, and conventional police stratagems such as
eavesdropping and disguise. The latter do not so seriously intrude
upon the right of privacy. The risk of being overheard by an
eavesdropper or betrayed by an informer or deceived as to the
identity of one with whom one deals is probably inherent in the
conditions of human society. It is the kind of risk we necessarily
assume whenever we speak. But as soon as electronic surveillance
comes into play, the risk changes crucially. There is no security
from that kind of eavesdropping, no wagy of mitigating the risk, and
so not even a residuum of true privacy.
The White plurality saw the issue as quantitative, that one always
runs the risk of having secrets divulged by a confident. The plurality
concluded that electronic eavesdropping is much more accurate than a
J., concurring). Justice Black, in a one-sentence concurrence, directed readers to his dissent in Katz,

in which he argued that intangible conversations are outside the realm of the Fourth Amendment
which, by its plain language, protects only "persons, houses, papers, and effects." See Katz, 389 U.S.

at 365-66. In summary, of the justices who held that the Fourth Amendment protections were
applicable to private conversations, four reasoned that the one-party consent rule was constitutional
and four reasoned that it was not.
64. Id. at 753.
65. Id. at 751.
66. Id.

67. Id.
68. Id. at 756.
69. 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
70. White, 401 U.S. at 759.
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7
person's memory and will probably lead to more effective evidence. 1
The one-party consent rule remains the federal standard.7 2

C. Privacy in Washington
Unlike the federal constitution, the Washington State Constitution,
adopted in 1889, explicitly provides for the protection of privacy.73 Only
the constitutions of nine other states have a similar provision.74 Of this
list, Washington, California, Florida, Illinois, and Montana also require
the permission of all parties to a telephone conversation before it can be
legally recorded. 75 Whether the all-party consent rule arose from the
explicit constitutional recognition of privacy, or is merely a result of the
same forces that shaped the constitutional provision is an open question.
The Washington State Constitutional Convention rejected the
language of the federal constitution's Fourth Amendment and
intentionally provided greater protection of individual rights.76 Unlike the
federal constitution, the Washington Constitution clearly recognizes an
individual's right to privacy with no express limitations.77
Washington first enacted a privacy statute in 1909.78 The first

statute governing electronic eavesdropping was enacted in 1967
(interestingly, the same year as the Katz decision), making it unlawful for
anyone not operating under judicial authorization to intercept or divulge
certain communications without the consent of all persons engaged in the
communication. 79 The law further provided that a court-ordered wiretap
71. See id. at 753.
72. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 94 (2001) ("However strongly a
defendant may trust an apparent colleague, his expectations in this respect are not protected by the
Fourth Amendment when it turns out that the colleague is a government agent regularly
communicating with the authorities.").
73. "Invasion of Private Affairs or Home Prohibited. No person shall be disturbed in his private
affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law." WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
74. Those states are the following: Alaska (ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 22), Arizona (ARIZ.
CONST. art. II, § 8), California (CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1), Florida (FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 23), Hawaii
(HAW. CONST. art. I, § 6), Illinois (ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 6), Louisiana (LA. CONST. art. I, § 5),
Montana (MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10), and South Carolina (S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10).
75. A moderate correlation exists between having a specific privacy provision in a state
constitution and two-party consent statutes in that same state. Of the ten states that have specific
state constitution-based privacy provisions, half are one-party consent states, half are all-party
consent states. Of the twelve states with all-party consent statutes, seven do not mention privacy in
their constitutions.
76. State v. Young, 123 Wash. 2d 173, 179, 867 P.2d 593, 596 (1994).
77. Id. at 180, 867 P.2d at 597.
78. The statute provided the following: "Every person ... who shall intercept, read or in any
manner interrupt or delay the sending of a message over any telegraph or telephone line.., shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor." REM. COMP. STAT. 1922, § 2656(18) (1909) (current version at WASH.
REV. CODE § 9.73.030).
79. State v. O'Neill, 103 Wash. 2d 853, 878, 700 P.2d 711,725 (1985).
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can be authorized only when there are reasonable grounds to believe that
national security or human life is endangered, or that arson or a riot is
about to occur.8 °
Portions of the WPA have been amended from time to time as
required to deal with issues perceived by the legislature. 8' For example,
in 1977 the Senate entered a proposal that would have replaced
Washington's all-party consent rule with a one-party consent rule,
similar to that of the federal government.8 2 Although this proposal was
rejected, a provision was adopted that gave law enforcement personnel
some latitude by enabling law enforcement officials to obtain court
orders where they are parties to the communication.8 3 The legislature
also incorporated an explicit procedure for obtaining consent, 4 along
with a provision that required after-the-fact notice (within thirty days) to
the person targeted for
surveillance, whether or not the surveillance is
85
authorized.
ultimately
The present one-party consent law permits a law enforcement
officer who is a party to the communication to intercept, transmit, or
record an otherwise private conversation with prior judicial consent, by
written or telephonic permission, from a judge or magistrate. 86 An
authorization under this section is valid for seven days, and may be
renewed for one additional seven-day period.87 Although this type of
one-party authorization would have been available to Detective Keller in
the case of Donald Townsend, there is no indication in the record that he
sought judicial authorization for his surveillance activities.
D. Interpretingthe Washington Privacy Act
What makes the decision in Townsend especially noteworthy is that
it represents a significant departure from past decisions that have usually

80. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.040 (2003). This provision has remained unchanged since being
enacted in 1967.
81. O'Neill, 103 Wash. 2d at 882, 700 P.2d at 727.
82. O'Neill, 103 Wash. 2d at 878, 700 P.2d at 725, citing S.B. 2419, 45th Leg., Exec. Sess.
(Wash. 1977).

83. Id. at 879, 700 P.2d at 725.
84. The procedure is as follows:

Where consent by all parties is needed pursuant to this chapter, consent shall be
considered obtained whenever one party has announced to all other parties engaged in the
communication or conversation, in any reasonably effective manner, that such
communication or conversation is about to be recorded or transmitted: PROVIDED, That

if the conversation is to be recorded that said announcement shall also be recorded.
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.030 (2004).
85. Id. § 9.73.140 (2004).
86. Id. § 9.73.090 (2) (2004).
87. Id. § 9.73.090 (4).
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interpreted the WPA in a way that is strongly protective of privacy
rights. The Washington Supreme Court has held that the legislative intent
of the WPA is clearly to protect the privacy of individuals, even in the
course of a public trial, from the public dissemination of illegally
obtained information. 8 A brief analysis of a number of Washington
cases involving the WPA gives rise to the conclusion that the legislature
and the judiciary highly value the protection of Washington citizens from
unauthorized eavesdropping.
For instance, in State v. Wanrow, the court held that the WPA
barred evidential use of a recording of an emergency phone call that a
witness made immediately after seeing a shooting. 89 The admission of
the tape-recorded message was held to be prejudicial and the case was
remanded for reconsideration without the recording. 90 Washington courts
have also held that recorded information obtained by federal officers,
although consistent with federal law, is inadmissible in Washington
courts. 9 1 Additionally, Washington courts have held that not only is
information directly derived from illegal transmissions or recordings
inadmissible in court, but the visual observations of the investigating
officers, made concurrently with the audio tapes, are also inadmissible.9 2
The testimony of a nosy neighbor who had persistently listened in
on cordless telephone conversations via a police scanner was held
inadmissible under the WPA.9 3 The court also held that the trial court
88. State v. Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d 221, 233, 559 P.2d 548, 555 (1977). The Wanrow court
stated the following:
Both the language and the history of RCW 9.73 make it clear the legislature's primary
purpose in enacting these statutes was the protection of the privacy of individuals...
even in the course of a public trial, of illegally obtained information. This purpose is best
furthered by giving only limited effect to the [emergency recording] exception.
89. Id. at 233, 559 P.2d at 555. The statute was subsequently amended to provide for
evidentiary use of the type of recording at issue in Wanrow. § 9.73.090(1)(a).
90. Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d at 233, 559 P.2d at 555.
91. State v. Williams, 94 Wash. 2d 531, 617 P.2d 1012 (1980). In Williams, federal agents
made tape recordings of their conversations with the defendants under the auspices of the one-party
consent rule underlying the federal wiretap statue, Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520. Id. Although these recordings were admissible in federal court, the
Washington Supreme Court held that they were made in violation of the WPA. Id. at 549, 617 P.2d
at 1022. The court, holding that federal officers were "individuals" within the meaning of the WPA,
not only suppressed the admission of the tapes themselves but also testimony of the federal officers
concerning their content. Id. at 536-37, 617 P.2d at 1015-16.
92. State v. Fjermestad, 114 Wash. 2d 828, 791 P.2d 897 (1990). In jermestad,police officers
conducting drug investigations routinely wore body wires for safety reasons. Id. at 829, 791 P.2d at
898. The officers, although aware of the WPA, also used the body wires to record evidence for a
drug bust without first seeking judicial authorization. Id. In addition to suppressing the recordings,
the Washington Supreme Court also held that the visual observations of the officers, such as their
impressions of the physical gestures of the suspect, were also inadmissible. Id. at 836-37, 791 P.2d
at 902.
93. State v. Faford, 128 Wash. 2d 476, 488, 910 P.2d 447, 453 (1996).
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erred by admitting evidence94 subsequently seized by the police pursuant
to the nosy neighbor's tips.

Despite this extensive record of enforcing privacy rights,
Washington courts are not entirely one-sided. For example, a police
officer listening in on a telephone conversation via a "tipped receiver"
did not violate the WPA because no device was used to record or
transmit the conversation. 95 A person who leaves a message on a
telephone answering machine has actual knowledge that their messages
are being recorded, and therefore has no reasonable expectation of
privacy. 96 However, both situations are distinguishable from the majority
of decisions cited above. In the case of the tipped receiver, the court is
drawing the line as to what constitutes a "device" within the meaning of
the WPA. In the case of the answering machine, actual knowledge of the
recording waives one's expectation of privacy.
III. ANALYSIS OF STATE V. TOWNSEND

Against this backdrop of state and federal decisions, it is possible to
analyze the Townsend court's reasoning. Subpart A of this section
presents the facts of Townsend. Subpart B contains the court's decision.
Subpart C presents an analysis of the court's reasoning. Subpart D
discusses the likely effect of the court's decision.
A. The Facts
Michael Ivers, the informant, first "met" Donald Townsend over
the Internet 97 in 1998. 98 After a short while, Ivers discontinued this initial

94. Id. In Faford, the court also upheld the trial court's ruling that precluded the State from

introducing various manufacturer's warnings of the "possibility" that conversations on wireless
telephones could be intercepted, holding that the warning of a possible interception did not establish
a likelihood of interception. Id. at 487, 910 P.2d at 452. Additionally, the court adopted a very broad

definition of "transmission" that included a radio scanner's conversion of inaudible radio waves into
audible sound. Id. at 483, 910 P.2d at 450.
95. In State v. Corliss, 123 Wash. 2d 656, 662, 870 P.2d 317, 320 (1994), the court adopted a

plain-language reading of the statute, holding that a police officer who listened in on a drug deal
while an informant "tipped" the telephone receiver in the officer's direction had not used a "device
designed to transmit or record" within the meaning of the WPA and thus no violation of the WPA
took place.
96. In Marriage of Farr,87 Wash. App. 177, 184, 940 P.2d 679, 683 (1997), the court held

that the fact that an answering machine's only function is to record messages satisfied the WPA's
implied notice requirement that a party consents to his or her communication being recorded when
another party has announced, "in any reasonably effective manner," that the conversation will be
recorded.
97. The Internet is nothing more or less than tens of thousands of interconnected computer
networks that follow a number of common rules (protocols) for sending messages, file transfers, and
dozens of other specific kinds of transmissions. ALAN E. BRILL, THE TECHNOLOGIES OF PRIVACY
AND PRIVACY INVASION: AN INTRODUCTION, 748 PLI/PAT 85, 94 (2003).
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contact because Townsend stated he wanted to have sexual intercourse
with young girls ages twelve, thirteen, and fourteen. 99 However, in 1999
some friends told Ivers that someone using the "handle" of "Big Red"
was harassing a nineteen-year-old female acquaintance.100 Ivers,
knowing this to be Townsend, resumed Internet discussions with him,
posing as two sisters, seventeen-year-old "Cassie" (with the e-mail
handle of "Angelheart"), and fourteen-year-old "Tammy."'' ° Tammy and
Cassie's initial communications with Townsend were general, but
gradually became sexually explicit.' 02 Townsend eventually told Tammy
and Cassie that he had a key to this place downtown where there was a
03
model train and he could meet them to engage in sexual activity.'
At
04
this point Ivers contacted Spokane County Detective Keller.'
Detective Keller set up a sting operation on the Internet by
assuming the guise of a thirteen-year-old girl named "Amber" by using a
Hotmail10 5 account with a screen name' 0 6 of "ambergirl87." Ivers then
introduced Amber to Townsend. 0 7 From May 21, 1999 to June 1, 1999,
Detective Keller communicated with Townsend via e-mail. 0 8 On June 1,
at Townsend's urging, Keller set up an ICQ 10 9 account and began
engaging in private chats." 0 The ICQ chats were more sexually explicit
than the e-mail communications that preceded them."' They included

98. Brief of Appellee at A-12, State v. Townsend, 105 Wash. App. 622, 20 P.3d 1027 (2001)
(No. 19304-7-Ill).
99. Id. at A-12, 13.
100. Id. at A-13.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.

105. MSN Hotmail is the world's largest provider of free, web-based e-mail. With Hotmail,
anyone can read and receive e-mail messages from any computer in the world connected to the
World Wide Web with an Internet connection. MSN, at http://help.msn.com/!data/en us/data/

HMFAQv7.its5l/$content$/HMFAQ WhatlsHotmailUnAuth.htm (last visited July 10, 2004).
106. Screen names are codes akin to nicknames, CB handles, and the like. No two screen
names may be exactly alike. United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 411 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
107. Brief of Appellee at A-13, State v. Townsend, 105 Wash. App. 622, 20 P.3d 1027 (No.
19304-7-111).

108. Id. at A-14.
109. ICQ means "I Seek You." It is a species of Internet communication invented by two
Israeli programmers that avoids the infrastructure associated with traditional e-mail. Rather than
sending messages through centralized e-mail servers, where they wait in storage to be downloaded,
ICQ messages find their way directly to the destination computer. Margo Lipschitz Sugarman,
Annus Mirabilis, THE JERUSALEM REPORT.COM, available at
10thAnniversary/1998/Article-12.html (last visited July 10, 2004).
110. Appellee's Brief at A-14, Townsend, (No. 19304-7-I11).
111.Id. at A-14.

http://www.jrep.com/lnfo/
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graphic discussions about having sexual intercourse, how one becomes
pregnant, and how they could avoid pregnancy.12
Eventually, a rendezvous was scheduled for June 4, 1999, at
Cavanaugh's, a local hotel." 13 In the last ICQ communication prior to this
hotel, and told Amber he
meeting, Townsend asked for directions to the
14
would get on the bus after he cooked dinner."
Just before 6:30 p.m., Townsend knocked on the door of room 119
at the hotel and asked for Amber." 5 He was arrested and transported to
Detective Keller's office and Mirandized. 1 6 Upon questioning, he
admitted that he came to the hotel to have sexual intercourse with
Amber, who he thought to be thirteen years old, but had changed his
mind during the trip over. 17
Townsend was charged in Spokane County Superior Court with
attempted second-degree rape of a child. 18 Prior to trial, Townsend
moved to dismiss the charge under the theory that Detective Keller's
recording and printing of his private e-mails and ICQ communications
was done without his consent, and were therefore inadmissible under the
WPA. 119 However, his motion to suppress the print-outs of the e-mail
messages was denied. 120 After a bench trial, Townsend was found guilty
and sentenced to eighty-nine months in prison. 121 Townsend appealed, in
part, on the theory that the trial court erred in admitting the e-mail and
ICQ messages that Detective Keller had recorded and subsequently
printed out for use as evidence. 122 The court of appeals held that although
the e-mail communications fell under the auspices of the WPA,

112. Id. at A-15.
113. Id.

114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. State v. Townsend, 147 Wash. 2d 666, 671, 57 P.3d 255, 258 (2002). Townsend was
charged under WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.076 (1999). See Brief for Appellant at 2, State v.
Townsend, 105 Wash. App. 622, 20 P.3d 1027 (2001) (19304-7-111).
119. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.030(l)(a) (2004). ("[l]t shall be unlawful for ... the state of
Washington [or] its agencies ... to intercept or record any ... [p]rivate communication transmitted
by telephone, telegraph, radio, or other device . . . without first obtaining the consent of all the
participants in the communication."); id. § 9.73.050 ("Any information obtained in violation of
RCW 9.73.030 . . . shall be inadmissible in any civil or criminal case in all courts of general or
limited jurisdiction in this state, except with the permission of the person whose rights have been
violated ...").
120. Townsend, 147 Wash. 2d at 671, 57 P.3d at 258.
121. Id.
122. See id. at 671-72, 57 P.3d at 258.
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Townsend had impliedly consented to their
recording.12 3 Review was
24
granted by the Washington Supreme Court.

B. The Washington Supreme Court's Decision
In a decision that yielded three opinions, the court upheld
Townsend's conviction. 21 Six of the justices, although finding the WPA
applicable, agreed with the appeals court and affirmed the conviction on
the basis that Townsend had "impliedly" consented to Detective Keller's
recording. Two justices never reached the question of Townsend's
consent. Rather, they held the WPA inapplicable where the recording
equipment was integral to the communications equipment. 126 The dissent
agreed with the majority that the statute was applicable, and that the
recording device did not need to be separate from the communications
equipment, but found that there was no basis from
which to infer
27
Townsend's consent to the recording of his messages.1
C. The Court's Analysis
The question of the applicability of the WPA to Townsend's e-mail
and ICQ messages was one of first impression. 28 Although e-mail and
ICQ messages are not mentioned in the WPA, the court did not question
whether Internet messages fit within the definition of a "communication
129
transmitted by telephone, telegraph, radio, or other device."'
Ultimately, there were three contested questions. First, were the
messages private? Second, was Detective Keller's computer a "device
electronic or otherwise designed to record"? Finally, did Townsend
impliedly consent to the recording of his messages? 130 I shall examine
each of these questions seriatim.
1. Were Townsend's Messages Private?
Internet messages are of three types:' 31 chat,1 32 instant messaging or
and e-mail. 134 Townsend and Detective Keller exchanged both e-

ICQ, 133

123. Id. at 672, 57 P.3d at 258.
124. State v. Townsend, 144 Wash. 2d 1016, 32 P.3d 283 (2001).
125. Townsend, 147 Wash. 2d at 666, 57 P.3d at 244 (8-1 decision) (Bridge, J., concurring)

(Sanders, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 680, 57 P.3d at 262.
127. See id. at 685-87, 57 P.3d at 265.
128. Brief of State at A-16, State v. Townsend, 105 Wash. App. 622, 10 P.3d 1027 (No.
19304-7-111).
129. See Townsend, 147 Wash. 2d at 672, 57 P.3d at 258-59. (quoting WASH. REV. CODE §
9.73.030(l) (2004)).
130. Townsend, 147 Wash. 2d at 673-75, 57 P.3d at 259-60.
131. United States v. Maxwell, 45 MJ.406, 411 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
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mail and instant messages. To determine whether a communication is
private, Washington courts use a "factors" analysis, in which the
following are considered: (1) the subjective intention of the parties to the
communications; (2) the duration and subject matter; (3) the location of
the communication and the presence of potential third parties; and (4) the
role of the non-consenting party and his or her relationship to the
consenting party.' 35 Interestingly, the Townsend court only addressed
Townsend's subjective intention, holding that "it is readily apparent from
the undisputed facts that Townsend's subjective intention was that his
messages to Amber were for her eyes only."' 36 The court's total failure to
address the question of the underlying privacy of e-mail communications
is inconsistent with the majority of other37courts who have addressed the
question of the discoverability of e-mail.
2. Were Townsend's Messages Recorded by a "Device"?
In order to fall within the auspices of the WPA, the private
communication must be intercepted or recorded by "any device
132. Chat communications, as implemented by America Online, take place in a virtual "room,"
usually specified by subject, where up to approximately twelve participants can maintain a group
discussion. Once a user enters a chat room, all the other participants are notified, and text typed by
one participant is visible to all. This form of communication is similar to a telephone party line. Id.
Messages sent in chat rooms lose any semblance of privacy. Id. at 419.
133. Instant messages, such as ICQ, allow a user to send a brief message of no more than 500
characters to another user who happens to be online at the time. These messages are not stored on
the e-mail server but are sent directly to the recipient's computer. ICQ messages are similar to a
telephone conversation. Id. at 411.
134. E-mail is a personal communication sent directly from one user to another. Id. The
recipient need not be logged into his computer at the time the e-mail is sent. Id. The only authorized
way to have access to an e-mail message is to be the recipient of the original message or of a
forwarded message. Id. A user must log onto the e-mail server in order to retrieve his e-mail. Id. Email transmissions are not unlike other forms of modem communication. Id. Drawing a parallel to
the sender of a first-class letter, if one seals the envelope and addresses it to another person, one can
reasonably expect the contents to remain private and free from the eyes of police absent a search
warrant. Id. This is similar to the maker of a telephone call who also has a reasonable expectation
that police officials will not intercept the conversation. Id. Drawing from these parallels, the
transmitter of an e-mail message enjoys a reasonable expectation that police officials will not
intercept the transmission without probable cause and a search warrant. Id. at 417-18.
135. Townsend, 147 Wash. 2d at 673-74, 57 P.3d at 259.
136. Id. at 674, 57 P.3d at 259. For example, one of Townsend's messages directed Amber to
"not tell anyone about us." Id. The court also considered the sexual subject matter of the
communication as strongly suggestive of Townsend's intent to keep the communications private. Id.
Despite this being a case of first impression, the court did not analyze the other elements.
137. At least one author has argued that the potential presence of third parties negates any
expectation of privacy in Internet communications. See BRILL, supra note 97, at 98; see also, e.g.,
United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 411-12, 417-19 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (discussing the varying
expectations of privacy in e-mail, instant messaging, and chat rooms); Fisher v. Mt. Olive, 207 F.
Supp.2d 914, 927 (W.D. Wis. 2002) (holding that it is disputed whether an e-mail account is a place
that a reasonable person would consider private).
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electronic or otherwise designed to record and/or transmit."1' 38 In the case
of Townsend, Detective Keller stored Townsend's messages on his
computer. 139 Both the majority 40 and the dissent 141 held that Detective

Keller's computer was a device as contemplated by the WPA, with the
concurring opinion holding that it was not because the device that
records must be separate from the equipment used in the
communication. 142 Ultimately, the majority cited the' 43plain language of
the statute which prohibits recording by "any device.'
The concurring opinion cited one additional factor that militates
toward a finding that e-mail communications should be exempt from the
WPA's prohibition on recording: To incorporate e-mail communications
under the WPA would create the absurd result of making all electronic
communication via computers criminal, since e-mail messages are
routinely recorded, and therefore e-mail messages are inherently in
violation of the WPA. 144 Seemingly, the concurrence in Townsend made
a very coherent argument that the WPA does not apply to e-mail
messages. In this case, the concurrence appears to have the betterreasoned argument. 45 Furthermore, the majority acknowledges that its
broad interpretation of the term "device" creates an issue with respect to
the infrastructure underlying e-mail 146communications, since electronic
communications are routinely stored.

138. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.030 (2004).
139. Townsend, 147 Wash. 2d at 670, 57 P.3d at 257.
140. Id.

141. Id. at 686, 57 P.3d at 265.
142. Id. at 682-83, 57 P.3d at 263-64.
143. Id. at 675 n.2, 57 P.3d at 260 n.2. However, there is substantial precedent for the
concurrence's reading of the statute. For example, in State v. Corliss, 78 Wash. App. 976, 982, 900

P.2d 564, 567 (1995), the court held that an investigating officer had not used a "device" within the
meaning of the WPA when he listened in on the defendant's telephone conversation while an
informant "tipped" the receiver in his direction. Similarly, in State v. Gonzales, 78 Wash. App. 976,

982, 900 P.2d 564, 567 (1995), the officer simply answered a ringing telephone in the defendant's
residence, and in State v. Bonilla, 23 Wash. App. 869, 873, 598 P.2d 783, 786 (1979), the officer

listened to a conversation on an extension telephone. In each, the appellate courts held that there was
no violation of the WPA because a separate device was not used. Given the Townsend holding that
the WPA does not require that the recording device be separate from the recording equipment, the
reasoning in each of the aforementioned cases (Corliss, Gonzales, and Bonilla), may no longer be
good law. See Townsend, 147 Wash. 2d at 675 n.2, 57 P.3d at 260 n.2.
144. See id. at 684, 57 P.3d at 264; see also State v. Fjermestad, 114 Wash. 2d 828, 835, 791

P.2d 897, 901 (1990) ("[Sltatutes should be construed to effect their purpose and unlikely, absurd, or
strained consequences should be avoided.").
145. See also Decoste, supra note 20, at 81. Organizations typically save the date on their email servers on a routine basis. Id. This backup storage is also a form of recording that arguably runs
afoul of the WPA.

146. See Townsend, 147 Wash. 2d at 675 n.2, 57 P.3d at 260 n.2. The majority wrote the
following: "While one could certainly mount a cogent argument for the proposition that the [WPA]
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3. Did Townsend Impliedly Consent to the Recording of His Messages?
Donald Townsend utilized two types of Internet communications,
e-mail and instant messaging. 147 Because these two types of
communications have different characteristics, the court analyzed them
separately.
a. E-mail Messages
The majority concluded that Donald Townsend impliedly consented
to the recording of his e-mail messages.14 8 Their reasoning is
summarized as follows: (1) The WPA provides that "a party is deemed to
have consented to a communication being recorded when another party
has announced in an effective manner that the conversation would be
recorded"; 49 (2) all information received or transmitted by the computer
is recorded and stored on the computer's hard drive and is therefore
available for later retrieval; 50 and (3) Townsend is properly deemed to
have consented to the recording of his messages.15 ' Each of these
assertions is problematic and will be examined in sequence.
i. Was Townsend effectively notified that his conversations
would be recorded?
In support of its assertion that Townsend impliedly consented to the
recording of his e-mail messages, the majority cited the following
wording from the WPA: "A party is deemed to have consented to a
communication being recorded when another party has announced in an
effective manner that the conversation would be recorded."'' 52 However,
the statute continues as follows: "PROVIDED, that if the conversation is
to be recorded that said announcement shall also be recorded."'' 53 For
purposes of simplicity, I will refer to this language as the "Implied
Consent" clause.
The Implied Consent clause that the court omits from the opinion is
critical. What it describes is the statutory method for obtaining the
implied consent of a participant in a recorded conversation. Note that the
should not apply . . . the language of the statute covers such recording. The legislature may,
however, wish to consider amending the statute in light of developments in technology."
147. See id., 147 Wash. 2d at 671, 57 P.3d at 258.
148. Id. at 676, 57 P.3d at 260.
149. Id. at 675, 57 P.3d at 260, quoting WASH REV. CODE § 9.73.030(l)(a) (2004).
150. See id. at 676-77 n.3, 57 P.3d at 260-61 n.3 ("Townsend, as a user of e-mail had to
understand that computers are ... message recording device[s] and that his e-mail messages would
be recorded on the computer of the person to whom the message was sent.").
151. Id.

152. Id. at 676, 57 P.3d at 260.
153. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.030(3) (2004) (Capitalization in original).
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capitalization of the word "PROVIDED" is included in the statute. The
legislature clearly intended that the words that follow are of special
importance. The special importance of this phrase takes on additional
significance when one examines the legislative history of the WPA. In
1977, the Washington Senate entered a proposal that would have aligned
what was Washington's all-party consent rule with the federal
government's one-party consent rule. 54 Ultimately, the legislature
rejected this proposal, but they did adopt other changes, including the
Implied Consent clause quoted above.' 55 What can be readily inferred
from this sequence of events is that the legislature was reluctant to
abrogate the privacy rights of Washington citizens, and the
"PROVIDED" language was put in place as an explicit protection against
exactly the kind of surreptitious recording that the WPA was intended to
prevent.
The issue arising from the court's omission of the Implied Consent
clause is readily apparent. By omitting this language, the court judicially
modifies the evidentiary level required for implied consent. The
legislature's apparent intent for their inclusion of this wording was that a
permanent record of this announcement be available to unambiguously
indicate that the person being recorded was on notice that their
conversation would be recorded. Applying this rule, which appears to
have been designed for aural recordings, to the case of e-mail messages,
such a record could have been in the form of an e-mail from Detective
Keller to Donald Townsend. Or, in the alternative, some instruction that
appeared on Townsend's computer prior to the sending of the message.
No record of this type was introduced into evidence. Therefore, as an
initial matter, the statutory requirement for implied consent under the
WPA was not met. As stated in the dissenting opinion: "The majority
engrafts by inference an unstated consent exception to Washington's
56
Inference plus implication equals loss of privacy."
privacy act ....
It is illuminating to examine a similar circumstance where a court
held that sufficient notice did exist to infer implied consent for officials
to record telephone conversations. In United States v. Green,157 a federal
154. See State v. O'Neill, 103 Wash. 2d 853, 878-79, 700 P.2d 711, 725 (1985), citing S. B.
2925, 45th Leg., Exec. Sess. (1977); Eng. S. B. 2419, 45th Leg., Exec. Sess. (1977).

155. Laws 1977, Exec. Sess., ch. 363, § 1.
156. Townsend, 147 Wash. 2d at 685, 57 P.3d at 265 (Sanders J., dissenting). Unlike the
implied consent exceptions judicially grafted by the Townsend court, such exceptions are explicitly
provided for in several Washington statutes. See, e.g., § 7.70.050 (4) (2004) (implied consent of
unconscious patient to emergency medical treatment); § 16.08.050 (2004) (implied consent for entry
upon another's property); § 26.16.030 (2) (2004) (implied consent of spouse to give away
community property); § 46.64.040 (2004) (implied consent of nonresident highway user to submit to
service of Washington process).
157. 842 F. Supp. 68 (W.D.N.Y. 1994).
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district court held that implied consent to record a private conversation
was found where a prison inmate made phone calls from a prison
phone. 158 However, this instance occurred in a factual setting vastly
different from that of Townsend. In Green, the defendant had attended a
prisoner orientation where he was told that phone calls would be
monitored, and had been given a prison handbook with the same
information.1 59 Furthermore, every prison telephone had a placard next 16to0
it alerting the defendant of the prison's monitoring capabilities.
However, there was no explicit warning that the prisoner's conversations
might be recorded. In reluctantly affirming a magistrate's finding that the
prisoner had impliedly consented to this recording, the district court
noted that "[o]ur holding should not, however, be construed as approving
the government's failure to seek proper authorization .... Such conduct

deserves no encouragement, but is rather to be deprecated; we do so.,,16I
The contrast between Green and Townsend is apparent. The
defendant in Green was on actual notice with respect to the monitoring
of his conversations, and the fact of his incarceration cannot be
overlooked. 62 In contrast, Townsend, although contemplating a socially
reprehensible act, had no overt warning that his conversations with
Amber were being recorded, and his circumstances did not give rise to
any inference similar to that reluctantly engrafted by the Green court.
ii. All information received or transmitted by the computer is recorded
and stored on the computer's hard drive.
This assertion, upon which both the majority and the concurrence
relied without citation,163 is not necessarily true. To understand why, a
brief discussion of computer technology is necessary.
Computers typically contain four types of memory: read-only
memory (ROM), random-access memory (RAM), permanent storage (a
hard drive, floppy disks, or other storage media), and virtual memory
(which is an extension of the RAM temporarily stored on the hard
drive). 164 ROM is typically used for machine functions and is not
available for user storage. 65 RAM is cleared every time a person loads a

158. Id. at 70.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 72 (citing United States v. Harrelson, 754 F.2d 1153, 1171 (5th Cir. 1985)).

162. Id. at 70.
163. State v. Townsend, 147 Wash. 2d 666, 677 n.3, 681, 57 P.3d 255, 261 n.3, 263 (2002).
164. MICHAEL MEYERS, A+ ALL-IN-ONE CERTIFICATION EXAM GUIDE, 5, 18, 82, 198 (3d ed.
2001).

165. Id. at 198.
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new program or turns the computer off. 166 Virtual memory is a portion of
1
the hard drive that has been converted for use as additional RAM, 67
however, a sophisticated computer programmer or forensic analyst can
probably access the virtual memory data stored on a hard drive, even
when a typical computer user would not know the data were stored
there. 68 In order for information to be saved (or "recorded" in the
language of the 'WPA) for later retrieval it must be saved to a computer's
69
hard drive. 1
The court, having already asserted that "all information received or
transmitted by the computer is stored on the hard drive,"' 7 ° then proceeds
to contradict this very fundamental assumption in its discussion of ICQ
communications. 17 1 For instance, the court asserts that "unlike e-mail,
ICQ technology does not require that messages be recorded for later
use. 172 The court goes on to say that "[w]hether the ICQ communication
is saved [longer than is required to answer] depends on the computer
software used by the recipient. 173 Paradoxically, the court describes and
documents an exception to what, in another portion of the opinion, is
presented as an absolute rule. Apparently, ICQ messages are useful
enough to some without being permanently recorded. It follows, then,
that not all information must be saved to the computer's hard drive in
order to be useful. Furthermore, other authorities simply do not support
the court's blanket assertion,
or, at a minimum, raise a reasonable doubt
74
as to its universality.1
166. Id.
167. Id. at 82.
168. Jason M. Paroff, David H. Schultz & Kristin M. Nimsger, Electronic Discovery in
Technology Litigation, 734 PL1/PAT 297, 373 (2003).
169. The issue of whether the temporary storage of information to RAM constitutes
"recording" in the language of the WPA has not been considered in Washington case law, but the
issue should be addressed. The term "record" has an ordinary meaning of "[a] documentary account
of past events, usually designed to memorialize those events; information that is inscribed on a
tangible medium or that, having been stored in an electronic or other medium, is retrievable in
perceivable form." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1279 (7th ed. 1999). However, this definition
considers only the noun form of the word, whereas the usage in the WPA is as a verb. See WASH.
REV. CODE § 9.73.030(1) (2004). Nevertheless, given the definition of the noun form and the
context in which the word is used in the WPA, the drafter's intention was to prohibit the making of a
record of a conversation that is capable of being retrieved in perceivable form. Using this reasoning,
the temporary storage of information in RAM is not "recording" within the meaning of the WPA,
but the permanent storage of information on the hard drive or other permanent storage devices is
"recording."
170. State v. Townsend, 147 Wash. 2d 666, 677 n.3, 57 P.3d 255, 261 n.3 (2002).
171. Id. at 676-77, 57 P.3d at 260-61.
172. Id.
173. ld. at 677, 57 P.3d at 261.
174. See David T. Cox, LitigatingChild Pornographyand Obscenity Cases in the Internet Age,
4 SuM J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 114 (1999). "Most e-mail programs keep copies of every message." ld.
(Emphasis added). "Each program functions differently with regard to how many messages are
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The court's flawed assumption regarding the universality of a
computer's recording of information seriously undermines the court's
next assertion, that Townsend had to know that his messages would be
recorded on the computer of the recipient.'7 5
iii. Did Townsend know that his e-mail messages would be recorded on
the computer of the recipient?
The Townsend court held that "Townsend, as a user of e-mail had
to understand that computers are, among other things, a message
recording device and that his e-mail messages would be recorded on the
computer of the person to whom the message was sent.' 76 The factual
premise underlying the court's assertion is less than absolute. Although it
is plausible that Townsend understood that his messages could be
recorded by the computer of the recipient, this is far different than
knowing that they would be recorded. Although the court attempts to
compare Townsend's act of sending the e-mail messages to that of
leaving a message on a telephone answering machine, the two are
radically different.177 The answering machine has but one purpose, and a
telephone answering machine also has an incoming greeting where the
caller is invited to leave a message. 78 Given the fact that telephone
answering machines have been in common use for many years and have
but one purpose, familiarity with answering machines as recording
devices can be reasonably inferred. They are distinct from the underlying
telephone call; they announce themselves and invite the user to leave a
message. Familiarity with computers as recording devices cannot be
reasonably inferred because of their novelty and the fact that they have
myriad purposes, and there is no real incentive to understand the details
of computer communications. 179 Furthermore, there is no indication that
saved and where they are saved, at what point they are saved and how messages are deleted. The
best way to test these variables is to get on the machine in question and start up the e-mail program."
Id. at 116.
175. Townsend, 147 Wash. 2d at 676, 57 P.3d at 260.
176. Id.
177. Id. Compare In re Marriage of Farr, 87 Wash. App. 177, 184, 940 P.2d 679, 683 (1997).
In Farr,the court held that a telephone answering machine recording was admissible under the WPA

because "an answering machine's only function is to record messages." Id. The court further
reasoned, "[k]nowing that [his] messages were being recorded, [the defendant] had no reasonable
expectation of privacy." Id.
178. The fact that the greeting is recorded also fulfills the statutory requirement that states,
"PROVIDED, That if the conversation is to be recorded that said announcement shall also be
recorded." WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.030(3) (2004).
179. See BRILL, supra note 97, at 94. "The power of the technology is that all of the nuts and

bolts.. underlying the process need not be known by the average user." Id. In other words, much of
what goes on inside a computer occurs without the user's awareness. For example, the default folder
containing a user's local cache of Hotmail messages (on a personal computer running Outlook 2002)
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the court made any finding of fact with regard to Townsend's level of
familiarity with computer technology that might have led it to the
conclusion that Townsend had any awareness that his e-mail messages
could be recorded on the computer of his recipient. The limited facts
available imply that Townsend was not a particularly adept computer
18 0
user.
The court erred in applying the doctrine of implied consent to
Donald Townsend's e-mail messages. First, the requirements for implied
consent under the WPA were not met. Second, the court employed the
erroneous factual premise that all messages are recorded on a computer's
hard drive. Third, the court imputed this knowledge to Townsend and
misapplied the analogy of a computer's cached record of e-mail
messages to a telephone answering machine.
b. ICQ Messages
Although the analysis of Townsend's e-mail messages applies
equally to the recording of his ICQ messages, the facts are slightly
different. The court cited two reasons why it was appropriate to impute
to Townsend the knowledge that his ICQ messages could be recorded. 181
First, the court felt that the fact that Townsend encouraged the fictitious
Amber to set up an ICQ account strongly suggested a familiarity with the
technology.' 82 Second, the ICQ software used by Townsend contained a
privacy policy that specifically warned users that their messages could be
recorded.183 Yet, within the same paragraph, the court states that "no
evidence was presented at trial that Townsend had acquainted himself
184
with the ICQ policy.',
Neither of these bases alone or combined is sufficient to impute to
Townsend the knowledge that his ICQ messages would be recorded. The
fact that Townsend had encouraged Amber to set up an ICQ account is
not probative of Townsend's level of technical expertise. Although it is
conceivable that it would be challenging to explain the process of
configuring a computer for ICQ communications to a thirteen-year-old
girl, Townsend was actually encouraging Detective Keller, who was no
is buried well within the directory structure at C:\Documents and Settings\<Username>\Local
Settings\Application Data\Microsoft\Outlook. See OL2002: How to Move the Hotmail .PST Cache
File, availableat http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=300593 (last visited July 10, 2004).
180. See Brief of State at A-15-16, State v. Townsend, 105 Wash. App. 622, 20 P.3d 1027

(No. 19304-7-Ill). The owner of Townsend's Internet service provider, Compufun, had been to the
Townsend residence on two occasions to check the Internet configurations. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.

184. Id.
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doubt well versed in computers and more than eager to comply with
Townsend's request. In other words, where Townsend might need to
explain the process of configuring a computer for ICQ communications
in detail to a thirteen-year-old girl, Detective Keller probably required no
assistance.
In further support of the proposition that Townsend possessed
limited knowledge of computer technology is the fact that the owner of
Townsend's Internet service provider testified that he had been out to the
Townsend's residence on two occasions to check Internet settings. 185
This fact does not correlate with the court's conclusion that Townsend
was a particularly knowledgeable Internet user and does not support a
finding that Townsend had familiarized himself with the ICQ privacy
policy.
In addition, it is highly speculative as to whether Townsend ever
read the privacy policy that accompanied the ICQ software. This privacy
policy was in the form of a clickwrap 86 license agreement. With this
type of license, a party wishing to install a particular software program is
presented with a scrollable text box 8 7 that contains the program's license
agreement. Furthermore, the party is not permitted to complete the
installation until the party clicks on a "Next" button to indicate that they
accept all the terms.
Washington courts have adopted the majority position that
clickwrap agreements form binding contracts. 188 However, this is a far
different proposition than imputing knowledge of the terms of the
agreement for purposes of criminal prosecution. Absent advance notice
that the terms of a clickwrap agreement may be used in support of
criminal charges, there is simply no reason to presume that a user will
familiarize himself with a multi-page license agreement, when a simple
click of the mouse will make it all go away. As the court in Townsend
correctly stated, "[t]he more pertinent question is whether Townsend was

185. See supra text accompanying note 180.
186. See Specht v. Netscape Commun. Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 22 n.4 (2nd Cir. 2002) ("This kind

of online software license agreement has come to be known as 'clickwrap,' by analogy to
'shrinkwrap,' used in the licensing of tangible forms of software sold in packages.").
187. The actual license agreement that was presented to Donald Townsend is unavailable. If
downloaded by July 10, 2004, the ICQ agreement presented in the scrollable text box would occupy

ten pages of single-spaced text if pasted into Microsoft Word.
188. See M.A. Mortenson, Inc. v. Timberline Software Corp., 140 Wash. 2d 568, 583-84, 998
P.2d 305, 313 (2000) (citing ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1996)). In

Mortenson, the court held that the purchaser of software had assented to the terms of a license
agreement where the terms were included in the shrinkwrap package, manuals, protective devices,
and are referenced each time the software is used. Id. at 584, 998 P.2d at 313. But see Specht, 306
F.3d at 32 (holding that a license is not binding where the license could not be displayed on visible
screen without scrolling).
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aware that the software [on a recipient's computer] was or could be
defaulted [to record incoming messages].' 8 9
Assuming that Townsend had familiarized himself with the ICQ
policy, this fact still does not rise to the notice required under the WPA.
The WPA explicitly stipulates that "consent shall be considered obtained
whenever one party has announced . . . that such communication or

conversation is about to be recorded or transmitted."' 90 At the most, the
dissent asserts, a technologically astute communicator might be aware
that under some circumstances his ICQ messages might be recorded. 19'
The court erred in determining that Townsend had impliedly
consented to the recording of his e-mail and ICQ messages. The wording
of the statute is extremely clear on the requirements for implied consent.
There is no indication that Townsend was aware that his messages were
being recorded, and certainly no indication that he had given his consent
for them to be recorded.
D. The Effect of Townsend
Donald Townsend was sentenced to prison for eighty-nine months
for his conviction on the charge of attempted second-degree rape of a
child. 192 The record does not include an indication of any substantial
evidence beyond Detective Keller's print-outs of Townsend's messages.
If the court had applied the reasoning of State v. Fjermestad,193 where
even the officer's, visual observations made concurrently with an illicit
recording were held inadmissible, the case against Townsend would have
been substantially weakened.
Although the court in Townsend held that e-mail and ICQ messages
are within the auspices of the WPA, the court's implied consent doctrine
leads to the conclusion that Washington's all-party consent rule is no
longer enforceable as it pertains to e-mail and ICQ messages.
Consequently, law-enforcement officials now have the green light to
utilize evidence derived from e-mails and ICQ messages sent to them by
the object of their surveillance, even when acting without judicial
authorization. What Townsend left unanswered is whether all users of email and ICQ messages are imputed with the knowledge that their
communications will be recorded. 194 Similarly, are all users of ICQ
189. State v. Townsend, 147 Wash. 2d 666, 677, 57 P.3d 255, 261 (2002).
190. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.030(3) (2004).
191. Townsend, 147 Wash. 2d at 685, 57 P.3d at 265 (Sanders, J. dissenting).
192. Id. at 671, 57 P.3d at 258.
193. State v. Fjermestad, 114 Wash. 2d 828, 829, 791 P.2d 897, 898 (1990).
194. With regard to the e-mail messages, "in sum, because Townsend, as a user of e-mail had
to understand that computers are, among other things, a message recording device and that his e-mail
messages would be recorded on the computer of the person to whom the message was sent, he is
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software presumed to have familiarized themselves with its ten pages of
terms? 195 The court's language in Townsend strongly supports this
interpretation. As a result, the all-party consent rule under the WPA is
probably no longer applicable to e-mail messages. Police officials are
now free to "record" e-mail and ICQ messages, so long as they are party
to them, without obtaining prior judicial authorization. Given the privacy
provisions in the Washington Constitution, the legislative history of the
WPA, and the trend of judicial interpretations consistently favoring the
preservation of privacy rights, this decision marks a significant break.
Although Townsend's holding could be construed as a mere recognition
of the realities of technological innovation, the Washington Supreme
Court has, on two occasions, refused to let technological innovation
dictate their interpretation of the WPA, holding, on one occasion, that
"our legal right to privacy should reflect thoughtful and purposeful
choices rather than simply
mirror the current state of the commercial
196
technology industry.'
The court's decision in Townsend will also encourage law
enforcement officials to push the boundaries of the WPA. The available
information indicates that Detective Keller could have obtained prior
judicial authorization for his monitoring activities.' 97 Courts have an
obligation to see that police investigators follow prescribed procedures.
If the police fail to obtain proper authorization, and a criminal goes free,
society pays the price. By sanctioning Detective Keller's monitoring, the
court has encouraged the police to push the boundaries of legality.
IV. CONCLUSION

Townsend stands for the proposition that electronic privacy is
exponentially more complex today than it was in 1967, the year when the
Washington Legislature first enacted a prohibition on electronic
eavesdropping. As was the case with conventional mail and the
telephone, it may be a considerable length of time before the level of
privacy afforded an e-mail message is solidified. For example, even

properly deemed to have consented to the recording of those messages." Townsend, 147 Wash. 2d at
676, 57 P.2d at 260.
195. With regard to the ICQ messages, the court summarized, "[a]lthough no evidence was
presented at trial establishing that Townsend had acquainted himself with the ICQ privacy policy,
his familiarity with it may reasonably be inferred." Id. at 678, 57 P.3d at 261-62. The court
continued, "[wie are satisfied, in sum, that Townsend was informed by ICQ software privacy policy
and by his general understanding of ICQ technology that the recording of ICQ messages by a
recipient is a possibility." Id.
196. State v. Faford, 128 Wash. 2d 476, 485, 910 P.2d 447, 451 (1996) (quoting State v.
Young, 123 Wash. 2d 173, 184, 867 P.2d 593, 598 (1994)).
197. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.090 (2004); see discussion accompanying note 88, supra.
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though the Townsend court held that e-mail messages are private within
the meaning of the WPA, 198 it is less clear that this expectation is

supported by the reality of the Internet. At least one authority has
compared the privacy expectation of an e-mail message to that of a post
card, with the destination address and the message openly available to
anyone who handles the message. 199 The Townsend court never
considered this aspect of the technology and, like many other courts that
have considered the issue, applied a legal doctrine developed for more
traditional forms of communication.200 This ignores the reality that
privacy was not originally a basic operating premise of the Internet. z°
The Washington Legislature has not kept pace with the realities of
modem communications2 °2 and, at a minimum, should enact the
following changes:
If the legislature concludes that the WPA does not apply to Internet
messages, the following language should be added: The Act's
proscription against the unauthorized recording of private messages shall
not apply to the recording of e-mail and ICQ messages on the computer
of the intended recipient, and shall permit the evidentiary use of such
messages.20 3
If the legislature concludes that the all-party default is the
appropriate standard for e-mail and ICQ messages, some clarifying
language is needed to ensure that the doctrine of implied consent is
consistently applied. Furthermore, language should be included within
the WPA to exempt the automatic caching of e-mail messages. An
exception could be crafted to permit the caching of e-mail messages on
the computer of the recipient, yet prohibit their evidentiary use. Such an
exception would be consistent with the spirit and past interpretation of
the WPA. I suggest the following language: This Act shall not prohibit
the automatic caching of e-mail messages routinely performed on the
computer of the intended recipient. However, such messages are not
198. Townsend, 147 Wash. 2d at 674, 57 P.3d at 259.
199. BRILL, supra note 97, at 98.

200. Decoste, supra note 20, at 87-88.
201. BRILL, supra note 97, at 108.

202. The trade-off between the one-party and all-party consent rule is essentially a give and
take between the ability of the police to readily obtain relevant and accurate evidence and the degree
of privacy we, as a society, believe is necessary. See Bast, supra note 18, at 911-15.
203. The emerging issue of Internet telephony must also be considered. Internet telephony is
the transmission of voice messages via the Internet instead of a public switched telephone network.
What
is it? At http://www.cs.tcd.ie/courses/baict/bac/jf/projects/99/
Internet Telephony:
telephony/ (last visited July 10, 2004). Since Internet telephony is similar to the aural
communications that are the conventional domain of the WPA, they are distinguishable from e-mail

and ICQ messages, and their recording should continue to require the permission of all parties to the
communication.
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admissible as evidence by the intended recipient without judicial
authorizationpursuant to RCW 9.73.090(2).
Additionally, the legislature should address the fact that e-mail
servers, because they routinely record e-mail messages, are technically in
violation of the WPA.2 °4 The appropriate language could readily be
inserted into section 9.73.070, which currently exempts activities
conducted by common carriers in the construction, maintenance, repair,
and operations of the common carrier's communications facilities. 20 5 1
suggest the following: This Act shall not prohibit the routine recording
of e-mail messages on the e-mail server of an e-mail provider that has
been authorized by the intended recipient. However, such messages are
not admissible as evidence by the intended recipient without judicial
authorizationpursuant to RCW 9.73.090(2).
There is also a significant question as to whether federal law should
preempt state law in this area. The federal government has enacted a
comprehensive body of law regarding communications technologies.20 6
To date, Washington courts have held that federal privacy law does not
preempt the state from enacting statutes that provide greater protection
than federal law.20 7 In fact, during the debate concerning the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,208 Congress specifically
provided for the possibility that individual states may want to apply a
more stringent privacy standard than that permitted under federal law.20 9
204. See State v.Townsend, 147 Wash. 2d 666, 675 n.2, 57 P.3d 255, 260 n.2 (2002).
205. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.070(1) provides: "The provisions of this chapter shall not apply

to any activity in connection with services provided by a common carrier pursuant to its tariffs on
file .... A suggested starting point for appropriate language could read: The provisions of this
chapter shall also not apply to computer systems employed as electronic mail servers, to the extent
of their essential function as recorders of electronic mail, PROVIDED the operator of the mail
server has an agreement onfile with the user to provide electronicmail services.

206. See, e.g., The Privacy Act of 1974, 6 U.S.C. § 552a (2004); Electronic Communications
Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522, 2701-2711 (2004); The USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 10756, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.); Communications Decency Act of
1006, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 223 (Supp. 11 1997)).
207. State v. Williams, 94 Wash. 2d 531, 539, 617 P.2d 1012, 1017 (1980). See also infra text

accompanying note 211.
208. Current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (2004).
209. "No applications may be authorized unless a specific State statute permits it. The State
statute must meet the minimum standards reflected as a whole in the proposed chapter. The proposed
provision envisions that States would be free to adopt more restrictive legislation or no legislation at
all, but not less restrictive legislation." S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 2187 (1968), reprinted in 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2187. But see Journal of the House at 2031 (Wash. 1967), dialog regarding
Engrossed Senate Bill No. 507 Prohibiting certain wiretapping and eavesdropping as follows:

Question by Mr. Backstrom: "1 have continuously offered my objections because of
eavesdropping. Do we have it clear that this bill precludes eavesdropping?" Answer by
Mr. Heavey: "Right now we have no laws that prevent eavesdropping .... This law

prevents them from doing it, but it does permit, in rare instances with court approval, the
prosecuting attorney or attorney general to eavesdrop or tap lines. I want to point out that
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However, we may be at the point where the federal government's
occupation of the field of regulating electronic communications is so
pervasive so as to make out an argument for federal preemption. There
would be advantages to having a consistent law regulating the
monitoring of electronic communications that applies uniformly across
fifty
210
all fifty states.
In light of the events of September 11, 2001, should
Washington reconsider its all-party consent rule?
In fact, the reaction from the legislature seems to be just the
opposite. Within the Washington Legislature there is an initiative to scale
back the expansion of federal eavesdropping powers passed pursuant to
the September 11 attack. 21 1 The legislature does not appear to be ready to
surrender its heritage of affording an enhanced degree of privacy rights
to Washington's citizens. However, only time will tell if the abrogation
of the all-party consent rule for e-mail and ICQ messages, manifest under
Townsend, is a temporary aberration or the new norm. If one applies the
lessons learned with respect to conventional mail and the telephone, the
direction that the court adopted in Townsend will affect the citizenry's
rights for a very long time.

this in no way circumvents the federal laws of wiretapping because they take precedence
over our laws."
Curiously, it appears from this 1967 dialog that the legislature understood that federal law
would preempt state law.
210. Although an extensive discussion of federal preemption is beyond the scope of this Note,
a cogent argument could be made that, given the fact that state borders are irrelevant to Internet
communications, and the expanding role of Internet communications in the national economy,
Congress could assert preeminence under its Commerce Clause powers. It also appears that the
Washington Legislature understood that federal law would preempt state law. See supra, text
accompanying note 206.
211. See S.J.M. 8053 (Wash. First Reading Feb. 4, 2004). The Memorial's authors indicate that
certain provisions of the U.S.A. Patriot Act (Public Law 107-56) are inconsistent with the WPA, as
follows:
WHEREAS, We believe these civil liberties are precious and are now threatened by
certain provisions of the U.S.A. P.A.T.R.I.O.T. Act... which:
Reduces judicial supervision of telephone and internet surveillance; Expands the
government's ability to conduct searches with and without warrants; Grants the FBI
broad access to sensitive and personal information without having to show evidence of a
crime, without a court order and, in some instances, without having to notify the target
and demonstrate that the information relates to terrorism; and
WHEREAS, The Senate of the State of Washington and the House of Representatives of
the State of Washington concur that the fight against terrorism must not be waged at the
expense of the essential rights and liberties of the residents of this state, as contained in
the United States Constitution and Bill of Rights and the Constitution of the State of
Washington.

